Lebanon has succeeded in avoiding the explosion which has been threatening the calm atmosphere, and which would have elevated the tension across three elements which are hampering stability in the region: the first element is the Sunni-Shiite sedition. The second is the ‘veto’ which the Palestinian factions in the Diaspora are holding over the internal settlement, such as Khaled Meshaal from Hamas and Farouk el Kaddoumi from Fatah. The third element is that the Al Qaeda proves that it benefits from the chaos in Lebanon in order to depict Palestinian refugees as fundamentalist terrorists rather than as resistance forces that work for liberating Palestine.

What happened in Nahr el Bared refugee camp in 2007 was a sample, and what happens every once in a while in Ain el Helwe camp is another sample. Reports say the international organization of Al Qaeda has a strategic thinking that if it was militarily defeated in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, then it will resort to the demography of the Palestinian Diaspora so as to revitalize its structure and carry on with its project of international terrorism.

The realities of these three elements affirm that the settlement requires blocking the road to stirring these elements that exist in Lebanon so as to preserve the overall tranquility in the region.



This analysis also says that if there was a plan for naturalization, then it will not be in Lebanon, as this country enjoys three characteristics that distinguish it from its region. The first is its diversity, meaning that the peoples in the region can live in tolerance – which is the philosophy on which settlement will be founded.

The second characteristic is that Lebanon has the oldest democratic system in the region. Despite the flaws of its experience, Lebanon has got used to living with the democratic election and the rotation of authorities, which is an experience that is, ought to continue and inspire the period of settlement and the period following it.


The third characteristic is Lebanon’s openness to the west, and to the new political, cultural, social, economic, and scientific moment.
All of these features will give Lebanon a role in protecting the elements of the settlement, thus the settlement will in turn work to protect it, so as to maintain its role.

This analysis also indicates that Lebanon has been living, since the Doha agreement, an international truce rather than a local political consensus. This means that the decision of truce in Lebanon is more powerful than the decision of blowing the truce, as it also means that the desire of its local groups to clash will eventually bump into the ceiling of international truce. This will continue as long as the power points of the chances of settlement are stronger than the chances of blowing it.

Israeli sabotage game:

However, all of the above does not mean that Lebanon is out of the danger zone. The Lebanese arena is still under a regional spotlight, as the powers of the region regard the country as a battlefield to let out its crises or re-shuffle its political cards and impose its own agenda rather than the current one led by US President Barack Obama.
Israel is the most prominent one of these powers. When Benjamin Netanyahu took office, he and his political and strategic team set a work plan, with the military strike against Iran to thwart if nuclear drive at its top.
In Israel, The local discussion on this topic is going on upon two levels: having Israel own the appropriate military technology to strike Iran and push it back decades thus totally destroying its nuclear potential. The second level is succeeding to convince the Obama administration of getting involved in the attack against Iran, or at least in preparing an atmosphere in which Israel can first launch the war alone, to be later joined by Washington.

On the first level, observers note the Israeli air force exercises which basically rely on preparing the best ways to provide the aircrafts with fuel. That in addition to the anti—air missile exercises, and air and marine testing for Israeli war machines.

After Russia was able, through invading Georgia, to thwart Israel’s efforts to turn the republic into a launching point for its planes in its war on Iran, as well as a center to collect information on the Islamic Republic, Israel is now seeking to use the Kurdistan of Iraq as an alternative.

However, in the backstage, an Israeli-Turkish clash is underway in the region, Ankara is not concerned for Iran, but rather it is scared that the Kurds would acquire advanced military and intelligence systems, which Israel is currently hiding in their areas, preparing for its strike on Iran.
The Turkish troops fear that these techniques would in time be used by Kurdistan against Turkey. Moreover, after striking Iran, or even if the nuclear controversy was resolved, Israel would gain a powerful domination across the borders with Turkey, as Tel Aviv would be part of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict.

As for Netanyahu’s mission against Iran, Israel is working hard to build an internal front supporting the mission. The front will be used as a justification to convince its community of the ‘significance and benefits of the cause’.

This discussion is conducted within the massive influence of the Jewish methodology. When Moses decided to lead the people of Israel through the desert, he was aware that his decision is a great adventure, but he also knew that he had to do that to save the people. Throughout his adventure, Moses had to believe in the rightness of his step so that he would gain the support of the people.

Today, Netanyahu is before an option in Iran’s case, similar to that which Moses had to make. The current PM also has to believe in the need to save the state of Israel and he must also gain the support of his people, this in addition to Israel’s declaration that Iran poses an existential threat on it, whereas Hizbullah’s threat is of a strategic nature.
In reference to the second aspect Netanyahu is seeking to find, related to convincing Obama of adopting his idea, the Zionist Lobby in the US is apparently divided between a group that supports Netanyahu, and another group which opposes him and advocates Obama’s idea of using up the peaceful ways first.

The Zionist Lobby that supports the attack on Iran speaks with a religious perspective. During the last meeting between him and Obama, a Lobby member that supports the strike told the US president that Washington should realize that Israel does not bow under pressure, but rather that it should be convinced by any opinion it shall adopt.

“Israel’s prophet, Moses, was not convinced in God until after God talked to him and gave him proof.”

Another lobby member who rejects the attack responded to his colleague saying: but Netanyahu is no Moses.

The first member then said: and Obama is not God.
War on Lebanon First

Away from Obama’s reality and Netanyahu’s prophetic ambitions, the new Iranian factor represented in the conflict within the Mullah regime in Qum on the backdrop of the re-election of President Mahmud Ahmedinejad, has led to alter Israel’s conviction that the attack on Iran is the priority, as Tel Aviv became closer to Washington as it now believes that it is necessary to let the internal development in Iran take its course, in case it was able to change Iran’s international, regional, and nuclear behavior.

At this point, the Israeli direction has begun to alter, from the priority of striking Iran, to the priority of attacking Hizbullah. Here, many scenarios have emerged, including striking Iran and Hizbullah at the same time, and another scenario that says the attack against Iran must be preceded by a comprehensive military attack on Hizbullah, as for the third scenario, it stated an Israeli deception to Obama through targeting a prominent figure of Hizbullah, such as assassinating the party’s secretary general Hassan Nasrallah, which might provoke Tehran to retaliate, an act which would be a justification for Israel to execute its strategic attack on Iran’s nuclear project, and thus, the US administration will not be able to blame Israel.



But such scenarios were proposed within planning under the slogan ‘Iran first’. However, now and with the adoption of a new slogan ‘Hizbullah First’, the supporters of this course say that attacking the party should be regarded as a step towards weakening Iran politically and militarily. Thus, the fact of Iran being occupied with its local status should be grabbed, along with striking its military power in Lebanon, especially as striking Hizbullah means destroying Iran’s strongest military base at the sidelines of the Middle East project.

According to the scenarios, the timing is open but the discussion is over the type of the strike and its techniques so as not to repeat the experience of the July war of 2006.

Informed Military sources say the problem of ‘how’ which faces Israel’s plan to strike Hizbullah is represented in three points: the first is that Israel until now does not have an efficient military response to Hizbullah’s long-range missile weapons.

The second is that all of the Israeli military exercises have not succeeded to make its troops able to adapt to the nature of the rough land where Hizbullah is deployed.

The third aspect is that the Israeli command is not united over the attack on Hizbullah.

While the type of the attack on Hizbullah is still being discussed, the point of agreement is that the strike should include the characteristic of ‘surprise’. This condition makes all of Israel’s reassurances that it will not strike Lebanon, dubious.

Today, the different groups in Netanyahu’s government have started to become more unanimous about a military attack on Lebanon and not only Hizbullah, this is according to Netanyahu who said “we used to deal with Hizbullah as a militia, but it has now become an army of a state,” which might lead to a re-shuffle of the cards in the region and would thus lift Obama’s pressure on the outlook of the Israeli Right about settlement, as it would make the US more focused on investing the results of Israel’s war on Lebanon, as well as taking Lebanon to build bases to support its settlement approach in the region.
Huda Husseini

H.C